Sunday, 26 December 2010

DAY ONE FOR THE WORKSHOP: TROPIC TOPICS

PSYCHOTROPIC-TOPICS:

HERMETIC ART DISCOURSES

POWER GAMES
UNDERGROUND CO-OPTED
HASH/ GRASS/ BEER PERCEPTION EFFECTS
BARCELONA ON ID CRISIS
HYPOCRITICAL KNOWLEDGE
FREE LEARNING


Saturday, 25 December 2010

DAY TWO FOR THE WORKSHOP: PSYCHOTROPIC PERIPATETIC SCHOOL DRIFT

PSYCHOTROPIC-TOPICS:

GRASS HIHGH 

SPLIF SPLIFS

ABERRATIONS OF CURATORIAL LANGUAGE

NOTIONS OF DETOUR AND DRIFT
FOUND AND LEFT THERE SCULPTURE
THEORY OF ART: POWER AND SYSTEMS

PSYCHOTROPIC-DERIVE-DRIFT








Nothing is what it seems learning is mediated by being totally high.....we are concentrated indeed! 


Friday, 24 December 2010

DAY THREE OF THE WORKSHOP : PSYCHOTROPIC ORDER

PSYCHOTROPIC-TOPICS :

SCI-FI DRUNKEN ALIENS PSYCHEDELLIC 
RE-ENACTING GRAFFITI MAKING
MIRROR EFFECT
CONCEPTUAL INCONTINENCE OF THE "MAN OF IDEAS"
TV TRANCES SIGNALS













Wednesday, 22 December 2010

DAY FOUR OF THE WORKSHOP : PSYCHOTROPIC UNEXPECTED

PSYCHOTROPIC-TOPICS:

HAZARDOUS BREAKS
CHANCE AND WRONG
MACHINE REVOLUTIONS
WHAT'S LEFT THERE
BRIGHT COLOURS HIGH





Psicotrópico (del griego psyche, "mente" y tropein, "tornar") es un agente que actúa sobre el sistema nervioso central, lo cual trae como consecuencia cambios temporales en la percepción, ánimo, estado de conciencia y comportamiento.



psy·cho·tro·pic (sk-trpk, -trpk) adj. Having an altering effect on perception or behavior. A psychotropic drug or other agent. psychotropic [-trop?ik] Etymology: Gk, psyche + trepein, to turn exerting an effect on the mind or modifying mental activity

psychotropic (s??·k?·tr??·pik), adj concerns that that affect the mind and influence behavior. psychotropic capable of modifying mental activity.







Friday, 3 December 2010

AFTER PSYCHOTROPIC CONCEPTS


THE IDEA IS THE MACHINE THAT MAKES THE ART



From 2 December to 16 December The BCN Psycho Tropic Workshops
was a working progress show featured at Antigua Casa Haiku in
Barcelona.
Curated by Alex Brahim.
The show was about a sort of retrospective and introspective tour
around material from the very far past and the immediate future.

It started as an introductory show/event where old and new films where
screened,a spoken word piece was re-enacted,the space had few sections
and made a total installation composed by big wood murals and zones
of painting as performance,references to Kaprow, Klein and Oiticica,and
a new project based on the Legend of The Chupacabras which was also part
of a virtual opening night at Miami Basel Art Fair

From the 6 till the 9 of December the workshops where on , participants
and ocasional visitors mixed and interchanged opinions and derives.
Finally the 16 of December and as a sort of conclusive performance,
a Club Esther night was reproduced for the first time ever inside a gallery
space.

Here are bits and fragments of how it was like.....


Collaborative setting between  Psycho Tropic workshop members






Opening Night


                                               International Red and Neo Concrete Presence


 6 white panels brushed with Colour Palette guide by the voice of Allan Kaprov









Dark Star Poster Set


































































    A spoken word re-enactment of Redum  a text piece from 1998



THE PSYCHOTROPIC WORKSHOPS


Psicotrópico (del griego psyche, "mente" y tropein, "tornar") es un agente que actúa sobre el sistema nervioso central, lo cual trae como consecuencia cambios temporales en la percepción, ánimo, estado de conciencia y comportamiento.

psy·cho·tro·pic (sk-trpk, -trpk) adj. Having an altering effect on perception or behavior. A psychotropic drug or other agent. psychotropic [-trop?ik] Etymology: Gk, psyche + trepein, to turn exerting an effect on the mind or modifying mental activity

psychotropic (s??·k?·tr??·pik), adj concerns that that affect the mind and influence behavior. psychotropic capable of modifying mental activity.



























Thursday, 2 December 2010

research material related Ranciere's Ignorant Master

Y la naturaleza de inventar no es distinta a la de acordarse. Dejemos pues a los explicadores «formar» el «gusto» y «la imaginación» de los señoritos, dejémosles disertar sobre el "genio" de los creadores. Nosotros nos limitaremos a hacer como estos creadores: como Hacine que aprendió de memoria, tradujo, repitió, imitó a Eurípides, Bossuet que hizo lo mismo con Tertuliano, Rousseau con Amyot, Boileau con Horacio y Juvenal; como Demóstenes que copió ocho veces Tucídides, Hooft que leyó cincuenta y dos veces Tácito, Séneca que recomienda la lectura siempre renovada de un mismo libro, Haydn que repitió indefinidamente seis sonatas de Bach, Miguel Ángel ocupado en rehacer siempre el mismo torso...9 La potencia no se divide. Sólo existe un poder, el de ver y el de decir, el de prestar atención a lo que se ve y a lo que se dice. Aprendemos frases y más frases; descubrimos los hechos, es decir, las relaciones entre cosas, y más relaciones aún, todas de la misma naturaleza; aprendemos a combinar las letras, las palabras, las frases, las ideas... No diremos que hemos adquirido la ciencia, que conocemos la verdad o que nos hemos convertido en un genio. Pero sabremos que podemos, en el orden intelectual, todo lo que puede un hombre.

Extracte del Maestro Emancipado de Jacques Ranciere

I am not You!!
Baudrillard argued that meaning (value) is created through difference - through what something is not (so "dog" means "dog" because it is not-"cat", not-"goat", not-"tree", etc.). In fact, he viewed meaning as near enough self-referential: objects, images of objects, words and signs are situated in a web of meaning; one object's meaning is only understandable through its relation to the meaning of other objects; in other words, one thing's prestige relates to another's mundanity.

Art Dustbin

The end of history is, alas, also the end of the dustbins of history. There are no longer any dustbins for disposing of old ideologies, old regimes, old values. Where are we going to throw Marxism, which actually invented the dustbins of history? (Yet there is some justice here since the very people who invented them have fallen in.) Conclusion: if there are no more dustbins of history, this is because History itself has become a dustbin. It has become its own dustbin, just as the planet itself is becoming its own dustbin

Unwritten doctrine

For a long time Plato's unwritten doctrine[32][33][34] had been considered unworthy of attention. Most of the books on Plato seem to diminish its importance. Nevertheless the first important witness who mentions its existence is Aristotle, who in his Physics (209 b) writes: "It is true, indeed, that the account he gives there [i.e. in Timaeus] of the participant is different from what he says in his so-called unwritten teaching (?????? ???????)." The term ?????? ??????? literally means unwritten doctrine and it stands for the most fundamental metaphysical teaching of Plato, which he disclosed only to his most trusted fellows and kept secret from the public. The reason for not revealing it to everyone is partially discussed in Phaedrus (276 c) where Plato criticizes the written transmission of knowledge as faulty, favoring instead the spoken logos: "he who has knowledge of the just and the good and beautiful ... will not, when in earnest, write them in ink, sowing them through a pen with words, which cannot defend themselves by argument and cannot teach the truth effectually." The same argument is repeated in Plato's Seventh Letter (344 c): "every serious man in dealing with really serious subjects carefully avoids writing." In the same letter he writes (341 c): "I can certainly declare concerning all these writers who claim to know the subjects that I seriously study ... there does not exist, nor will there ever exist, any treatise of mine dealing therewith." Such secrecy is necessary in order not "to expose them to unseemly and degrading treatment" (344 d).

La misma inteligencia crea los nombres y crea los signos de las matemáticas. La misma inteligencia crea los signos y crea los razonamientos. No existen dos tipos de espíritu. Existen distintas manifestaciones de la inteligencia, según sea mayor o menor la energía que la voluntad comunique a la inteligencia para descubrir y combinar relaciones nuevas, pero no existen jerarquías en la capacidad intelectual. Es la toma de conciencia de esta igualdad de naturaleza la que se llama emancipación y la que abre la posibilidad a todo tipo de aventuras en el país del conocimiento. Ya que se trata de atreverse a aventurarse y no de aprender más o menos bien o más o menos rápido. El «método Jacotot» no es mejor, es otro. Ésta es la razón por la que los procedimientos puestos en juego importan poco por sí mismos."
El maestro ignorante. Jacques Ranciere . p.19

"De este modo, el socratismo es una forma perfeccionada del atontamiento. Al igual que todo maestro sabio, Sócrates pregunta para instruir. Ahora bien, quien quiere emancipar a un hombre debe preguntarle a la manera de los hombres y no a la de los sabios, para ser instruido y no para instruir. Y eso sólo lo hará con exactitud aquél que efectivamente no sepa más que el alumno, el que no haya hecho antes que él el viaje, el maestro ignorante."

El maestro ignorante. Jacques Ranciere . p.20


Joseph Jacotot
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search

Joseph (or Jean-Joseph) Jacotot (4 March 1770 - 30 July 1840) was a French teacher and educational philosopher, creator of the method of "intellectual emancipation." He was born at Dijon on the 4th of March 1770. He was educated at the university of Dijon, where in his nineteenth year he was made a professor of Latin, after which he studied law, became a lawyer, and at the same time devoted a large amount of his attention to mathematics. In 1788 he organized a federation of the youth of Dijon for the defence of the principles of the Revolution; and in 1792, with the rank of captain, he set out to take part in the campaign of Belgium, where he conducted himself with bravery and distinction. After filling the office of secretary of the commission d’organisation du mouvement des armées, in 1794 he became deputy of the director of the École Polytechnique. Upon the founding of the central schools at Dijon he was appointed to the chair of the "method" or instruction of science. There he made his first experiments in his "emancipatory" method of teaching. When the central schools were replaced by other educational institutions, Jacotot occupied the chairs of mathematics and of Roman law until the overthrow of the empire. In 1815 he was elected a representative to the chamber of deputies; but after the Second Restoration he found it necessary to quit his native land.

Having taken up his residence at Brussels, in 1818 Jacotot was nominated teacher of the French language at the University of Louvain, where he systematized the educational principles which he had already practised with success in France.

His emancipatory or panecastic (French: panécastique "everything in each" from Greek πᾶν and ἕκαστον) method was not only adopted in several institutions in Belgium, but also met with some approval in France, England, Germany, and Russia. It was based on three principles:

1. all men have equal intelligence;
2. every man has received from God the faculty of being able to instruct himself;
3. everything is in everything.

Regarding the first principle, he maintained that it is only in the will to use their intelligence that men differ. His own process, depending on the third principle, was to give a student learning a language for the first time a short passage of a few lines, and to encourage the pupil to study first the words, then the letters, then the grammar, then the meaning, until a single paragraph became the occasion for learning an entire literature. After the revolution of 1830 Jacotot returned to France, and he died in Paris on 30 July 1840.

Jacotot described his system in Enseignement universel (universal education), langue maternelle (Louvain and Dijon, 1823)—which passed through several editions—and in various other works; and he also advocated his views in the Journal de l’êmancipation intellectuelle and elsewhere. For a complete list of his works and fuller details regarding his career, see Biographie de J. Jacotot, by Achille Guillard (Paris, 1860).

Jacotot's career and principles are also described by Jacques Rancière in The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation (Stanford University Press, 1991).

This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Chisholm, Hugh, ed (1911). Encyclopædia Britannica (Eleventh ed.). Cambridge University Press.
Persondata
Name Jacotot, Joseph
Alternative names
Short description
Date of birth 4 March 1770
Place of birth
Date of death 30 July 1840
Place of death
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Jacotot"

10.
www.filo.uba.ar/contenidos/secretarias/seube/revistaespacios/.../41.14.pdf

Wednesday, 1 December 2010

Psychotropic Peripatetic School

Peripatetic school
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
Aristotle's School, a painting from the 1880s by Gustav Adolph Spangenberg
Part of a series on
Aristotle
Aristoteles Louvre.jpg
Aristotelianism[show]
Peripatetic school
physics
ethics
term logic
view of women
view of God (unmoved mover)
Corpus Aristotelicum[show]
Physics
Organon
Nicomachean Ethics
Politics
Metaphysics
On the Soul
Rhetoric
Poetics
Ideas[show]
Correspondence theory of truth
hexis
virtue ethics (golden mean)
four causes
telos
temporal finitism
antiperistasis
nature
potentiality and actuality
universals (substantial form)
hylomorphism
mimesis
substances (ousia) & accidents
essence
category of being
phronesis
magnanimity
sensus communis
rational animal
genus-differentia definition
Influences & Followers[show]
Plato
Alexander the Great
Theophrastus
Avicenna
Averroes
Maimonides
St. Thomas Aquinas
Alasdair MacIntyre
Martha Nussbaum
Related[show]
Platonism
Commentaries on Aristotle
Scholasticism
Conimbricenses
Pseudo-Aristotle

Socrates blue version2.pngPhilosophy portal

v • d • e

The Peripatetics were members of a school of philosophy in ancient Greece. Their teachings derived from their founder, the Greek philosopher, Aristotle, and Peripatetic is a name given to his followers. The school originally derived its name Peripatos from the peripatoi (περίπατοι "colonnades") of the Lyceum gymnasium in Athens where the members met. A similar Greek word peripatetikos (Greek: περιπατητικός) refers to the act of walking, and as an adjective, "peripatetic" is often used to mean itinerant, wandering, meandering, or walking about. After Aristotle's death, a legend arose that he was a "peripatetic" lecturer -- that he walked about as he taught -- and the designation Peripatetikos came to replace the original Peripatos.


The school dates from around 335 BC when Aristotle began teaching in the Lyceum. It was an informal institution whose members conducted philosophical and scientific inquiries. Aristotle's successors Theophrastus and Strato continued the tradition of exploring philosophical and scientific theories, but after the middle of the 3rd century BC, the school fell into a decline, and it was not until the Roman era that there was a revival. Later members of the school concentrated on preserving and commentating on Aristotle's works rather than extending them, and the school eventually died out in the 3rd century AD.


Although the school died out, the study of Aristotle's works continued by scholars who were called Peripatetics through Later Antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance. After the fall of the Roman empire, the works of the Peripatetic school were lost to the west, but in the east they were incorporated into early Islamic philosophy, which would play a large part in the revival of Aristotle's doctrines in Europe in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

Contents
[hide]

* 1 Background

* 2 Doctrines
* 3 History of the school
* 4 Influence
* 5 Notes
* 6 References
* 7 See also

[edit] Background


The term "Peripatetic" is a transliteration of the ancient Greek word περιπατητικός peripatêtikos, which means "of walking" or "given to walking about".[1] The Peripatetic school was actually known simply as the Peripatos.[2] Aristotle's school came to be so named because of the peripatoi ("colonnades" or "covered walkways") of the Lyceum gymnasium where the members met.[3] The legend that the name came from Aristotle's alleged habit of walking while lecturing may have started with Hermippus of Smyrna.[4] Unlike Plato, Aristotle was not a citizen of Athens and so could not own property; he and his colleagues therefore used the grounds of the Lyceum as a gathering place, just as it had been used by earlier philosophers such as Socrates.[5] Aristotle and his colleagues first began to use the Lyceum in this way in about 335 BC.,[6] after Aristotle left Plato's Academy and Athens and then returned to Athens from his travels about a dozen years later.[7] Because of the school's association with the gymnasium, the school also came to be referred to simply as the Lyceum.[5] Some modern scholars argue that the school did not become formally institutionalized until Theophrastus took it over, at which time there was private property associated with the school.[8]


Originally at least, the Peripatetic gatherings were probably conducted less formally than the term "school" suggests: there was likely no set curriculum or requirements for students, or even fees for membership.[9] Aristotle did teach and lecture there, but there was also philosophical and scientific research done in partnership with other members of the school.[10] It seems likely that many of the writings that have come down to us in Aristotle's name were based on lectures he gave at the school, or vice versa.[11]


Among the members of the school in Aristotle's time were Theophrastus, Phanias of Eresus, Eudemus of Rhodes, Clytus of Miletus, Aristoxenus, and Dicaearchus.[12] Much like Plato's Academy, there were in Aristotle's school junior and senior members, the junior members generally serving as pupils or assistants to the senior members who directed research and lectured.[12] The aim of the school, at least in Aristotle's time, was not to further a specific doctrine, but rather to explore philosophical and scientific theories; those who ran the school worked rather as equal partners.[12]


Sometime shortly after Alexander's death in June 323 BC, Aristotle left Athens to avoid persecution by anti-Macedonian factions in Athens due to his ties to Macedonia.[13]


After Aristotle's death in 322 BC, his colleague Theophrastus succeeded him as head of the school. The most prominent member of the school after Theophrastus was Strato of Lampsacus, who increased the naturalistic elements of Aristotle's philosophy and embraced a form of atheism.

[edit] Doctrines

The doctrines of the Peripatetic school are the doctrines laid down by Aristotle, and henceforth maintained by his followers.


Whereas Plato had sought to explain things with his theory of Forms, Aristotle preferred to start from the facts given by experience. Philosophy to him meant science, and its aim was the recognition of the "why" in all things. Hence he endeavoured to attain to the ultimate grounds of things by induction; that is to say, by a posteriori conclusions from a number of facts to a universal.[14] Logic either deals with appearances, and is then called dialectics; or of truth, and is then called analytics.[15]


All change or motion takes place in regard to substance, quantity, quality and place.[15] There are three kinds of substances - those alternately in motion and at rest, as the animals; those perpetually in motion, as the sky; and those eternally stationary. The last, in themselves immovable and imperishable, are the source and origin of all motion. Among them there must be one first being, unchangeable, which acts without the intervention of any other being. All that is proceeds from it; it is the most perfect intelligence - God.[15] The immediate action of this prime mover - happy in the contemplation of itself - extends only to the heavens; the other inferior spheres are moved by other incorporeal and eternal substances, which the popular belief adores as gods. The heavens are of a more perfect and divine nature than other bodies. In the centre of the universe is the Earth, round and stationary. The stars, like the sky, beings of a higher nature, but of grosser matter, move by the impulse of the prime mover.[15]


For Aristotle, matter is the basis of all that exists; it comprises the potentiality of everything, but of itself is not actually anything.[14] A determinate thing only comes into being when the potentiality in matter is converted into actuality. This is achieved by form, the idea existent not as one outside the many, but as one in the many, the completion of the potentiality latent in the matter.[14]


The soul is the principle of life in the organic body, and is inseparable from the body. As faculties of the soul, Aristotle enumerates the faculty of reproduction and nutrition; of sensation, memory and recollection; the faculty of reason, or understanding; and the faculty of desiring, which is divided into appetition and volition.[15] By the use of reason conceptions, which are formed in the soul by external sense-impressions, and may be true or false, are converted into knowledge.[14] For reason alone can attain to truth either in understanding or action.[14]


The best and highest goal is the happiness which originates from virtuous actions.[15] Aristotle did not, with Plato, regard virtue as knowledge pure and simple, but as founded on nature, habit, and reason.[14] Virtue consists in acting according to nature: that is, keeping the mean between the two extremes of the too much and the too little.[15] Thus valor, in his view the first of virtues, is a mean between cowardice and recklessness; temperance is the mean in respect to sensual enjoyments and the total avoidance of them.[15]

[edit] History of the school
Aristotle and his disciples - Alexander, Demetrius, Theophrastus, and Strato. Part of a fresco in the National University of Athens.

The names of the first seven or eight scholarchs (leaders) of the Peripatetic school are known with varying levels of certainty. A list of names with the approximate dates they headed the school is as follows:[16]


* Aristotle (c. 334-322)

* Theophrastus (322-288)
* Strato of Lampsacus (288-c. 269)
* Lyco of Troas (c. 269-225)
* Aristo of Ceos (225-c. 190)
* Critolaus (c. 190-155)
* Diodorus of Tyre (c. 140)
* Erymneus (c. 110)

There are some uncertainties in this list. It is not certain whether Aristo of Ceos was the head of the school, but since he was a close pupil of Lyco and the most important Peripatetic philosopher in the time when he lived, it is generally assumed that he was. It is not known if Critolaus directly succeeded Aristo, or if there were any leaders between them. Erymneus is known only from a passing reference by Athenaeus.[17] Other important Peripatetic philosophers who lived during these centuries include Eudemus of Rhodes, Aristoxenus, Dicaearchus, and Clearchus of Soli.


After the time of Strato, the Peripatetic school fell into a decline. Lyco was famous more for his oratory than his philosophical skills, and Aristo is perhaps best known for his biographical studies;[18] and although Critolaus was more philosophically active, none of the Peripatetic philosophers in this period seem to have contributed anything original to philosophy.[19] The reasons for the decline of the Peripatetic school are unclear. Undoubtably Stoicism and Epicureanism provided many answers for those people looking for dogmatic and comprehensive philosophical systems, and the scepticism of the Middle Academy may have seemed preferable to anyone who rejected dogmatism.[20] Later tradition linked the school's decline to Neleus of Scepsis and his descendents hiding the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus in a cellar until their rediscovery in the 1st century BC, and even though this story may be doubted, it is possible that Aristotle's works were not widely read.[21]


In 86 BCE, Athens was sacked by the Roman general Lucius Cornelius Sulla, all the schools of philosophy in Athens were badly disrupted, and the Lyceum ceased to exist as a functioning institution.[19] Ironically, this event seems to have brought new life to the Peripatetic school. Sulla brought the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus back to Rome, where they became the basis of a new collection of Aristotle's writings compiled by Andronicus of Rhodes which forms the basis of the Corpus Aristotelicum which exists today.[19] Later Neoplatonist writers describe Andronicus, who lived around 50 BCE, as the eleventh scholarch of the Peripatetic school,[22] which would imply that he had two unnamed predecessors. There is considerable uncertainty over the issue, and Andronicus' pupil Boethus of Sidon is also described as the eleventh scholarch.[23] It is quite possible that Andronicus set up a new school where he taught Boethus.


Whereas the earlier Peripatetics had sought to extend and develop Aristotle's works, from the time of Andronicus the school concentrated on preserving and defending his work.[24] The most important figure in the Roman era is Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. 200 CE) who commentated on Aristotle's writings. With the rise of Neoplatonism (and Christianity) in the 3rd century, Peripateticism as an independent philosophy came to an end, but the Neoplatonists sought to incorporate Aristotle's philosophy within their own system, and produced many commentaries on Aristotle's works. In the 5th century, Olympiodorus the Elder is sometimes described as a Peripatetic.

[edit] Influence
Main article: Aristotelianism
See also: Avicennism, Averroism, and Scholasticism

The last philosophers in classical antiquity to comment on Aristotle were Simplicius and Boethius in the 6th century. After this, although his works were mostly lost to the west, they were maintained in the east where they were incorporated into early Islamic philosophy. Some of the greatest Peripatetic philosophers in the Islamic philosophical tradition were Al-Kindi (Alkindus), Al-Farabi (Alpharabius), Avicenna (Ibn Sina) and Averroes (Ibn Rushd). By the 12th century, Aristotle's works began being translated into Latin during the Latin translations of the 12th century, and gradually arose Scholastic philosophy under such names as Thomas Aquinas, which took its tone and complexion from the writings of Aristotle, the commentaries of Averroes, and The Book of Healing of Avicenna.

[edit]

text , references, commented, found etc


extract from Boris Grois at e-flux:
More than anything else, what the installation offers to the fluid, circulating multitudes is an aura of the here and now. The installation is, above all, a mass-cultural version of individual flânerie, as described by Benjamin, and therefore a place for the emergence of aura, for “profane illumination.” In general, the installation operates as a reversal of reproduction. The installation takes a copy out of an unmarked, open space of anonymous circulation and places it—if only temporarily—within a fixed, stable, closed context of the topologically well-defined “here and now.” Our contemporary condition cannot be reduced to being a “loss of the aura” to the circulation of ritual beyond “here and now,” as described in Benjamin’s famous essay on “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.”3 Rather, the contemporary age organizes a complex interplay of dislocations and relocations, of deterritorializations and reterritorializations, of de-auratizations and re-auratizations.
Benjamin shared high modernist art’s belief in a unique, normative context for art. Under this presupposition, to lose its unique, original context means for an artwork to lose its aura forever—to become a copy of itself. To re-auratize an individual artwork would require a sacralization of the whole profane space of a copy’s topologically undetermined mass circulation—a totalitarian, fascist project, to be sure. This is the main problem to be found in Benjamin’s thinking: he perceives the space of a copy’s mass circulation—and mass circulation in general—as a universal, neutral, and homogeneous space. He insists upon the visual recognizability, on the self-identity of a copy as it circulates in our contemporary culture. But both of these principal presuppositions in Benjamin’s text are questionable. In the framework of contemporary culture, an image is permanently circulating from one medium to another medium, and from one closed context to another closed context. For example, a bit of film footage can be shown in a cinema, then converted to a digital form and appear on somebody’s Web site, or be shown during a conference as an illustration, or watched privately on a television in a person’s living room, or placed in the context of a museum installation. In this way, through different contexts and media, this bit of film footage is transformed by different program languages, different software, different framings on the screen, different placement in an installation space, and so on. All this time, are we dealing with the same film footage? Is it the same copy of the same copy of the same original? The topology of today’s networks of communication, generation, translation, and distribution of images is extremely heterogeneous. The images are constantly transformed, rewritten, reedited, and reprogrammed as they circulate through these networks—and with each step they are visually altered. Their status as copies of copies becomes an everyday cultural convention, as was previously the case with the status of the original. Benjamin suggests that the new technology is capable of producing copies with increasing fidelity to the original, when in fact the opposite is the case. Contemporary technology thinks in generations—and to transmit information from one generation of hardware and software to the next is to transform it in a significant way. The metaphoric notion of “generation” as it is now used in the context of technology is particularly revealing. Where there are generations, there are also generational Oedipal conflicts. All of us know what it means to transmit a certain cultural heritage from one generation of students to another.
We are unable to stabilize a copy as a copy, as we are unable to stabilize an original as an original. There are no eternal copies as there are no eternal originals. Reproduction is as much infected by originality as originality is infected by reproduction. In circulating through various contexts, a copy becomes a series of different originals. Every change of context, every change of medium can be interpreted as a negation of the status of a copy as a copy—as an essential rupture, as a new start that opens a new future. In this sense, a copy is never really a copy, but rather a new original, in a new context. Every copy is by itself a flâneur—experiencing time and again its own “profane illuminations” that turn it into an original. It loses old auras and gains new auras. It remains perhaps the same copy, but it becomes different originals. This also shows a postmodern project of reflecting on the repetitive, iterative, reproductive character of an image (inspired by Benjamin) to be as paradoxical as the modern project of recognizing the original and the new. This is likewise why postmodern art tends to look very new, even if—or actually because—it is directed against the very notion of the new. Our decision to recognize a certain image as either an original or a copy is dependent on the context—on the scene in which this decision is taken. This decision is always a contemporary decision—one that belongs not to the past and not to the future, but to the present. And this decision is also always a sovereign decision—in fact, the installation is a space for such a decision where “here and now” emerges and profane illumination of the masses takes place.
So one can say that installation practice demonstrates the dependency of any democratic space (in which masses or multitudes demonstrate themselves to themselves) on the private, sovereign decisions of an artist as its legislator. This was something that was very well known to the ancient Greek thinkers, as it was to the initiators of the earlier democratic revolutions. But recently, this knowledge somehow became suppressed by the dominant political discourse. Especially after Foucault, we tend to detect the source of power in impersonal agencies, structures, rules, and protocols. However, this fixation on the impersonal mechanisms of power lead us to overlook the importance of individual, sovereign decisions and actions taking place in private, heterotopic spaces (to use another term introduced by Foucault). Likewise, the modern, democratic powers have meta-social, meta-public, heterotopic origins. As has been mentioned, the artist who designs a certain installation space is an outsider to this space. He or she is heterotopic to this space. But the outsider is not necessarily somebody who has to be included in order to be empowered. There is also empowerment by exclusion, and especially by self-exclusion. The outsider can be powerful precisely because he or she is not controlled by society, and is not limited in his or her sovereign actions by any public discussion or by any need for public self-justification. And it would be wrong to think that this kind of powerful outsidership can be completely eliminated through Modern progress and democratic revolutions. The progress is rational. But not accidentally, an artist is supposed by our culture to be mad—at least to be obsessed. Foucault thought that medicine men, witches, and prophets have no prominent place in our society any more—that they became outcasts, confined to psychiatric clinics. But our culture is primarily a celebrity culture, and you cannot become a celebrity without being mad (or at least pretending to be). Obviously, Foucault read too many scientific books and only a few society and gossip magazines, because otherwise he would have known where mad people today have their true social place. It is also well known that the contemporary political elite is a part of global celebrity culture, which is to say that it is external to the society it rules. Global, extra-democratic, trans-state, external to any democratically organized community, paradigmatically private—I would say that these are the icons of a privacy understood also as a rejection of logic and reason, as a degree of sovereignty of judgment equivalent to madness. These icons are, in fact, structurally mad—insane.
Now, these reflections should not be misunderstood as a critique of installation as an art form by demonstrating its sovereign character. The goal of art, after all, is not to change things—things are changing by themselves all the time anyway. Art’s function is rather to show, to make visible the realities that are generally overlooked. By taking aesthetic responsibility in a very explicit way for the design of the installation space, the artist reveals the hidden sovereign dimension of the contemporary democratic order that politics, for the most part, tries to conceal. The installation space is where we are immediately confronted with the ambiguous character of the contemporary notion of freedom that functions in our democracies in parallel with sovereign and institutional freedom. The artistic installation is thus a space of unconcealment (in the Heideggerian sense) of the heterotopic, sovereign power that is concealed behind the obscure transparency of the democratic order.
×
A version of this text was given as a lecture at Whitechapel Gallery, London, on October 2, 2008.

SITUATION- EVENT - PSYCHOTROPIC - PERCEPTION-

CLUB ESTHER RE-ENACTED SCHOOL PSYCHOTROPICA

SETTING:
POST-WHITE CUBE,TABLES,
CHAIRS, MUSIC, DRINKS, STUDENTS,
PERFORMANCES, XMAS LIGHTS,
DERANGED LIVE SET BY DIRTY SNOW,
NOISE, FANZINES, EPHEMERA, TEACHERS,
POSTERS, GUEST ARTIST, ZOMBIES,
"DETOURNED"ARTS WORKS AS STAGE PIECES,
SCULPTURES, LEFT OVERS, LOTS OF PEOPLE.

































Sound Performance  by detourned line up of Live Sculpture Dirty Snow






Collaborative setting between  Psycho Tropic workshop members