////////THE BCN PSYCHO-TROPIC WORKSHOPS////////

AFTER PSYCHOTROPIC CONCEPTS

2010-12-26T05:08:00.000-08:00

THE IDEA IS THE MACHINE THAT MAKES THE ART

2010-12-19T04:52:00.000-08:00

CLUB ESTHER/////

SETTING:
NEO-WHITE CUBE,TABLES,
CHAIRS,DJ MUSIC,DRINKS,
PERFORMANCES,XMAS LIGHTS,
DERANGED LIVE SET BY DIRTY SNOW,
NOISE,FANZINES,EPHEMERA,T SHIRTS,
POSTERS,GUEST ARTIST,ANAMOR LOVE
TAROT,PERE FAURE READINGS,
"DETOURNED"ART WORKS AS STAGE PIECES,
SCULPTURES,LEFT OVERS,LOTS OF PUBLIC.

WHAT THE FUCK IS THIS??

What is Club Esther? Club Esther is a NO-CLUB -NO HYPE- NO COOL-NO ARTY ART_

A no no no no and NO
No shit
Is pure S+M =sub-serviance
IT'S NARCISSISTIC BECAUSE: Obedience to the law is freedom!!!
FUCK YOU ALL
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
http://www.clubesther.biz/club/club.htm

AN EXCERPT OF THE TEXT BY JORG HEISER
TORTURE AND REMEDY: THE END OF -ISMS
AND THE BEGINNING HEGEMONY OF THE IMPURE

...But whether or not you’re against the idea of movements no longer seems to be the problem. From the 1970s on, it has been difficult or next to impossible to clearly identify them in the first place. Everything became “neo-this” or “post-that,” or a pronounced crossbreed between previous movements. Around the early 1980s in Europe and the U.S., “neo-expressionist” painting set out to reinvigorate older ideas of artistic intensity and immediacy, but—to generalize—remained less about changing the way you painted than about changing the way you presented yourself doing so. The method—paint fast, wittily—was considered a direct outpouring of a (usually masculine) rebellious attitude. At around the same time, neo-conceptual or appropriation artists such as Richard Prince or Sherrie Levine built on the achievements of Marcel Duchamp and Andy Warhol, on the ideas of the readymade, of appropriating existing cultural artifacts as art, and of making intelligent artistic use of reproduction technologies. But regardless of their qualities as individual artists, the question remains whether they truly advanced or departed from these pioneers with that methodology. The same could be said of artists such as Rirkrit Tiravanija or Philippe Parreno who, from the mid 1990s on, have been associated with the catch phrase “Relational Aesthetics”: did their artistic evocations of social situations (whether cooking in a gallery or buying the rights to a Japanese anime character), their deconstructions of the categories of “artwork” and “exhibition,” really move beyond the achievements of the 1960s? After all, already in 1969 a conceptual artist, for example, offered a reward of $1,100 for information leading to the arrest of a bank robber wanted by the FBI (Douglas Huebler, Duration Piece No. 15, Global). In the contemporary Chinese context, similar questions can probably be asked about the “Cynical Realism,” “Political Pop,” or “Gaudy Art” styles of the 1990s: besides their aspirations to subvert through satirical, ironical, or grotesque figurative representation and their indisputable pioneering importance for the establishment of a new art scene, what did they really achieve methodologically in comparison to earlier movements?.....
more here:http://e-flux.com/journal/view/100
.......................................................................................

THE REVENGE OF THE WHITE CUBE * (Manifesta Journal)

It seems that the idea of the "white cube" is already overcome. Cultural strategies in the 1980s and 1990s were turned against the white cube, trying to relate the works, projects and exhibitions to actual time and space and to the social and political realities. The "white cube" was considered to be out of time and space, an ideal, a sterile, utopian place for no less sterile autonomous art. Several recent exhibitions and other events, including the last Documenta XI, indicate a different understanding of the "white cube" and a new importance of white cube strategies for curatorial work today. With contributions by: Beti Žerovc, Boris Groys, Hedwig Fijen, Art & Language, Bart de Baere, Iara Boubnova, Branislav Dimitrijevic, Charles Esche, WHW, Viktor Misiano and Igor Zabel.

DAY FOUR OF THE WORKSHOP : UNEXPECTED

2010-12-14T05:28:00.000-08:00

TOPICS:
THE LAMENTS OF JEREMY/JEREMIAS
HAZARDOUS BREAKS
CHANCE AND WRONG
MACHINE REVOLUTIONS
WHAT'S LEFT THERE
DEBORD DERIVE

B U R E A U O F P U B L I C S E C R E T S

Theory of the D�rive

One of the basic situationist practices is the d�rive,(1) a technique of rapid passage through varied ambiences. D�rives involve playful-constructive behavior and awareness of psychogeographical effects, and are thus quite different from the classic notions of journey or stroll.

In a d�rive one or more persons during a certain period drop their relations, their work and leisure activities, and all their other usual motives for movement and action, and let themselves be drawn by the attractions of the terrain and the encounters they find there. Chance is a less important factor in this activity than one might think: from a d�rive point of view cities have psychogeographical contours, with constant currents, fixed points and vortexes that strongly discourage entry into or exit from certain zones.

But the d�rive includes both this letting-go and its necessary contradiction: the domination of psychogeographical variations by the knowledge and calculation of their possibilities. In this latter regard, ecological science, despite the narrow social space to which it limits itself, provides psychogeography with abundant data.

The ecological analysis of the absolute or relative character of fissures in the urban network, of the role of microclimates, of distinct neighborhoods with no relation to administrative boundaries, and above all of the dominating action of centers of attraction, must be utilized and completed by psychogeographical methods. The objective passional terrain of the d�rive must be defined in accordance both with its own logic and with its relations with social morphology.

In his study Paris et l’agglom�ration parisienne (Biblioth�que de Sociologie Contemporaine, P.U.F., 1952) Chombart de Lauwe notes that “an urban neighborhood is determined not only by geographical and economic factors, but also by the image that its inhabitants and those of other neighborhoods have of it.” In the same work, in order to illustrate “the narrowness of the real Paris in which each individual lives . . . within a geographical area whose radius is extremely small,” he diagrams all the movements made in the space of one year by a student living in the 16th Arrondissement. Her itinerary forms a small triangle with no significant deviations, the three apexes of which are the School of Political Sciences, her residence and that of her piano teacher.

Such data — examples of a modern poetry capable of provoking sharp emotional reactions (in this particular case, outrage at the fact that anyone’s life can be so pathetically limited) — or even Burgess’s theory of Chicago’s social activities as being distributed in distinct concentric zones, will undoubtedly prove useful in developing d�rives.

If chance plays an important role in d�rives this is because the methodology of psychogeographical observation is still in its infancy. But the action of chance is naturally conservative and in a new setting tends to reduce everything to habit or to an alternation between a limited number of variants. Progress means breaking through fields where chance holds sway by creating new conditions more favorable to our purposes. We can say, then, that the randomness of a d�rive is fundamentally different from that of the stroll, but also that the first psychogeographical attractions discovered by d�rivers may tend to fixate them around new habitual axes, to which they will constantly be drawn back.

An insufficient awareness of the limitations of chance, and of its inevitably reactionary effects, condemned to a dismal failure the famous aimless wandering attempted in 1923 by four surrealists, beginning from a town chosen by lot: Wandering in open country is naturally depressing, and the interventions of chance are poorer there than anywhere else. But this mindlessness is pushed much further by a certain Pierre Vendryes (in M�dium, May 1954), who thinks he can relate this anecdote to various probability experiments, on the ground that they all supposedly involve the same sort of antideterminist liberation. He gives as an example the random distribution of tadpoles in a circular aquarium, adding, significantly, “It is necessary, of course, that such a population be subject to no external guiding influence.” From that perspective, the tadpoles could be considered more spontaneously liberated than the surrealists, since they have the advantage of being “as stripped as possible of intelligence, sociability and sexuality,” and are thus “truly independent from one another.”

At the opposite pole from such imbecilities, the primarily urban character of the d�rive, in its element in the great industrially transformed cities that are such rich centers of possibilities and meanings, could be expressed in Marx’s phrase: “Men can see nothing around them that is not their own image; everything speaks to them of themselves. Their very landscape is alive.”

One can d�rive alone, but all indications are that the most fruitful numerical arrangement consists of several small groups of two or three people who have reached the same level of awareness, since cross-checking these different groups’ impressions makes it possible to arrive at more objective conclusions. It is preferable for the composition of these groups to change from one d�rive to another. With more than four or five participants, the specifically d�rive character rapidly diminishes, and in any case it is impossible for there to be more than ten or twelve people without the d�rive fragmenting into several simultaneous d�rives. The practice of such subdivision is in fact of great interest, but the difficulties it entails have so far prevented it from being organized on a sufficient scale.

The average duration of a d�rive is one day, considered as the time between two periods of sleep. The starting and ending times have no necessary relation to the solar day, but it should be noted that the last hours of the night are generally unsuitable for d�rives.

But this duration is merely a statistical average. For one thing, a d�rive rarely occurs in its pure form: it is difficult for the participants to avoid setting aside an hour or two at the beginning or end of the day for taking care of banal tasks; and toward the end of the day fatigue tends to encourage such an abandonment. But more importantly, a d�rive often takes place within a deliberately limited period of a few hours, or even fortuitously during fairly brief moments; or it may last for several days without interruption. In spite of the cessations imposed by the need for sleep, certain d�rives of a sufficient intensity have been sustained for three or four days, or even longer. It is true that in the case of a series of d�rives over a rather long period of time it is almost impossible to determine precisely when the state of mind peculiar to one d�rive gives way to that of another. One sequence of d�rives was pursued without notable interruption for around two months. Such an experience gives rise to new objective conditions of behavior that bring about the disappearance of a good number of the old ones.(2)

The influence of weather on d�rives, although real, is a significant factor only in the case of prolonged rains, which make them virtually impossible. But storms or other types of precipitation are rather favorable for d�rives.

The spatial field of a d�rive may be precisely delimited or vague, depending on whether the goal is to study a terrain or to emotionally disorient oneself. It should not be forgotten that these two aspects of d�rives overlap in so many ways that it is impossible to isolate one of them in a pure state. But the use of taxis, for example, can provide a clear enough dividing line: If in the course of a d�rive one takes a taxi, either to get to a specific destination or simply to move, say, twenty minutes to the west, one is concerned primarily with personal disorientation. If, on the other hand, one sticks to the direct exploration of a particular terrain, one is concentrating primarily on research for a psychogeographical urbanism.

In every case the spatial field depends first of all on the point of departure — the residence of the solo d�river or the meeting place selected by a group. The maximum area of this spatial field does not extend beyond the entirety of a large city and its suburbs. At its minimum it can be limited to a small self-contained ambience: a single neighborhood or even a single block of houses if it’s interesting enough (the extreme case being a static-d�rive of an entire day within the Saint-Lazare train station).

The exploration of a fixed spatial field entails establishing bases and calculating directions of penetration. It is here that the study of maps comes in — ordinary ones as well as ecological and psychogeographical ones — along with their correction and improvement. It should go without saying that we are not at all interested in any mere exoticism that may arise from the fact that one is exploring a neighborhood for the first time. Besides its unimportance, this aspect of the problem is completely subjective and soon fades away.

In the “possible rendezvous,” on the other hand, the element of exploration is minimal in comparison with that of behavioral disorientation. The subject is invited to come alone to a certain place at a specified time. He is freed from the bothersome obligations of the ordinary rendezvous since there is no one to wait for. But since this “possible rendezvous” has brought him without warning to a place he may or may not know, he observes the surroundings. It may be that the same spot has been specified for a “possible rendezvous” for someone else whose identity he has no way of knowing. Since he may never even have seen the other person before, he will be encouraged to start up conversations with various passersby. He may meet no one, or he may even by chance meet the person who has arranged the “possible rendezvous.” In any case, particularly if the time and place have been well chosen, his use of time will take an unexpected turn. He may even telephone someone else who doesn’t know where the first “possible rendezvous” has taken him, in order to ask for another one to be specified. One can see the virtually unlimited resources of this pastime.

Our rather anarchic lifestyle and even certain amusements considered dubious that have always been enjoyed among our entourage — slipping by night into houses undergoing demolition, hitchhiking nonstop and without destination through Paris during a transportation strike in the name of adding to the confusion, wandering in subterranean catacombs forbidden to the public, etc. — are expressions of a more general sensibility which is no different from that of the d�rive. Written descriptions can be no more than passwords to this great game.

The lessons drawn from d�rives enable us to draft the first surveys of the psychogeographical articulations of a modern city. Beyond the discovery of unities of ambience, of their main components and their spatial localization, one comes to perceive their principal axes of passage, their exits and their defenses. One arrives at the central hypothesis of the existence of psychogeographical pivotal points. One measures the distances that actually separate two regions of a city, distances that may have little relation with the physical distance between them. With the aid of old maps, aerial photographs and experimental d�rives, one can draw up hitherto lacking maps of influences, maps whose inevitable imprecision at this early stage is no worse than that of the earliest navigational charts. The only difference is that it is no longer a matter of precisely delineating stable continents, but of changing architecture and urbanism.

Today the different unities of atmosphere and of dwellings are not precisely marked off, but are surrounded by more or less extended bordering regions. The most general change that d�rive experiences lead to proposing is the constant diminution of these border regions, up to the point of their complete suppression.

Within architecture itself, the taste for d�riving tends to promote all sorts of new forms of labyrinths made possible by modern techniques of construction. Thus in March 1955 the press reported the construction in New York of a building in which one can see the first signs of an opportunity to d�rive inside an apartment:

“The apartments of the helicoidal building will be shaped like slices of cake. One will be able to enlarge or reduce them by shifting movable partitions. The half-floor gradations avoid limiting the number of rooms, since the tenant can request the use of the adjacent section on either upper or lower levels. With this setup three four-room apartments can be transformed into one twelve-room apartment in less than six hours.”

(To be continued.)

GUY DEBORD
1958

[TRANSLATOR’S NOTES]

1. d�rive: literally �drift� or �drifting.� Like d�tournement, this term has usually been anglicized as both a noun and a verb.

2. “The d�rive (with its flow of acts, its gestures, its strolls, its encounters) was to the totality exactly what psychoanalysis (in the best sense) is to language. Let yourself go with the flow of words, says the psychoanalyst. He listens, until the moment when he rejects or modifies (one could say detourns) a word, an expression or a definition. The d�rive is certainly a technique, almost a therapeutic one. But just as analysis unaccompanied with anything else is almost always contraindicated, so continual d�riving is dangerous to the extent that the individual, having gone too far (not without bases, but...) without defenses, is threatened with explosion, dissolution, dissociation, disintegration. And thence the relapse into what is termed ‘ordinary life,’ that is to say, in reality, into ‘petrified life.’ In this regard I now repudiate my Formulary’s propaganda for a continuous d�rive. It could be continuous like the poker game in Las Vegas, but only for a certain period, limited to a weekend for some people, to a week as a good average; a month is really pushing it. In 1953-1954 we d�rived for three or four months straight. That’s the extreme limit. It’s a miracle it didn’t kill us” (Ivan Chtcheglov, excerpt from a 1963 letter to Mich�le Bernstein and Guy Debord, reprinted in Internationale Situationniste #9, p. 38).

“Th�orie de la d�rive” was published in Internationale Situationniste #2 (Paris, December 1958). A slightly different version was first published in the Belgian surrealist journal Les L�vres Nues #9 (November 1956) along with accounts of two d�rives. This translation by Ken Knabb is from the Situationist International Anthology (Revised and Expanded Edition, 2006). No copyr
El Libro de las Lamentaciones ( איכה ʾēḫā(h), Eikha), atribuido a Jeremías, es un documento del Antiguo Testamento de la Biblia, y también del Tanaj. La Biblia cristiana lo ubica en las series de Libros proféticos, entre Jeremías y Ezequiel en las Biblias protestantes, y entre Jeremías y Baruc, en las ediciones católicas y ortodoxas.
Contenido
[ocultar]

* 1 Nombre y ubicación
* 2 Autor
* 3 Época
* 4 Utilización
* 5 Contenido
o 5.1 Primera lamentación
o 5.2 Segunda lamentación
o 5.3 Tercera lamentación
o 5.4 Cuarta lamentación
o 5.5 Quinta lamentación
* 6 Características particulares
* 7 Referencias
* 8 Véase también

[editar] Nombre y ubicación

El Tanaj hebreo ubica este libro en los Ketuvim ("escritos"). Sin embargo, las versiones griega y latina las colocan a continuación de Jeremías, a quien se atribuye su composición.

El nombre hebreo del libro es ekah. Más tarde, la literatura rabínica lo llamó qinot, que los LXX tradujeron como Trenos y la Vulgata por "Lamentaciones".
[editar] Autor

Tanto la tradición judía como la cristiana atribuyen el libro a la pluma de Jeremías, apoyando sus afirmaciones en el hecho de que el contenido de los poemas corresponden a la época en que vivió el profeta. En la Septuaginta[1] y en la versión de Torres Amat se relata que fue éste profeta quien pronunció esas palabras al contemplar a Jerusalén devastada:

“Después que Israel fue llevado cautivo y quedo Jerusalén desierta, estaba sentado el profeta Jeremías llorando, y endecho sobre Jerusalén con la siguiente lamentación, y suspirando con amargura de animo y dando alaridos, dijo:”[2]

Sin embargo, no hay prueba alguna de la autoría de Jeremías. El único indicio es una sola frase en II Crónicas: "Jeremías compuso una lamentación sobre Yosiyahu" (2 Crónicas 35:25). A pesar de que en efecto el libro se escribió en forma inmediata a los hechos, es difícil certificar la atribución.

El primer problema es que Jeremías no parece un hombre inclinado a géneros tan complicados y difíciles como los poemas de lamentación; por otra parte, no formaba parte del partido proegipcio (el libro implora la ayuda del faraón), ni se alegró por la muerte de Sedecías (el libro la celebra), ni, por cierto, testimoniaría en contra de la verdad de las profecías (era él mismo un profeta).

Las teorías actuales sostienen que las Lamentaciones se escribieron en Jerusalén luego de la catástrofe de 587 a. C., pero no por la misma mano ni al mismo tiempo. Los autores verdaderos fueron obviamente judíos piadosos y versados en la Ley, y, con toda probabilidad, eran sacerdotes que conocían perfectamente el Libro de Jeremías. El capítulo 1 puede ser tan antiguo como de 597 a. C.

Por lo tanto, es difícil que las manifestaciones del Talmud, los LXX y el Tárgum en el sentido de que Jeremías escribió el texto puedan mantenerse. Las tres fuentes no hacen en realidad nada más que repetir la atribución de 2 Crónicas 35:25.

Seguir a la antigua fuente solucionaba el problema de atribución con autoridad bíblica pero hoy se sabe que no corresponde a la autoridad.
[editar] Época

Salvo el capítulo 1, las Lamentaciones fueron escritas en Jerusalén en fecha posterior a la caída de la ciudad en manos de los caldeos y deben haber servido para las ceremonias religiosas que persistieron en el templo luego del Exilio (Jeremías 41:5).
[editar] Utilización

Como los textos se refieren al arrepentimiento por las desobediencias que causaron la catástrofe bélica, junto con el duelo de la ciudad y sus habitantes, los judíos las recitan en el gran ayuno que conmemora la destrucción del Segundo Gran Templo de Jerusalén a manos de los babilonios
[editar] Contenido

El libro contiene cinco poemas de lamentación por la destrucción de Jerusalén tras haber caído en manos de Nabucodonosor II en 587 a. C.

Evocan, por tanto, la destrucción de Judá y el horror del sitio de la ciudad.
[editar] Primera lamentación

El poeta llora la debacle y, personificando a la ciudad como alegoría, ambos reconocen el pecado del pueblo que causara la dura caída.
[editar] Segunda lamentación

Se conduele del castigo tan severo que Yahvéh envía a los judíos y exige a la ciudad que haga penitencia.
[editar] Tercera lamentación

Equipara su propio sufrimiento con el del resto de la ciudad y anhela para sí los perdones de la divinidad.
[editar] Cuarta lamentación

Nueva lamentación por la catástrofe y el abandono en que se encuentra la ciudad.
[editar] Quinta lamentación

Es un fuerte grito pidiendo ayuda y una lamentación de todo el pueblo implorando la asistencia de Yahvéh. La Vulgata latina la titula "Oración del profeta Jeremías".
[editar] Características particulares

Las cinco endechas o elegías son independientes unas de otras y presentan características distintas. La tercera es una lamentación individual; la quinta una colectiva y la primera, segunda y cuarta constituyen oraciones fúnebres.

Las cuatro primeras configuran cantos alfabéticos en los cuales cada verso comienza con una letra hebrea distinta. Sin embargo, el orden alfabético de la lamentación primera es totalmente distinto de los de la segunda, tercera y cuarta.
[editar] Referencias

1. ↑ Lamentaciones (preámbulo), LXX
2. ↑ Lamentaciones (introducción), Biblia de José Petisco y Félix Torres Amat

[editar] Véase también

* Libro de Jeremías
* Jeremías
* II Crónicas
* Libro de Judit
* Antiguo Testamento
* Biblia

Libro anterior:
Jeremías
Lamentaciones
(Libros proféticos)
Libro siguiente:
Baruc

DAY THREE OF THE WORKSHOP : PSYCHOTROPIC ORDER

2010-12-08T15:22:00.000-08:00

TOPICS :
IGNORANTS AND MASTERS
RE-ENACTING GRAFFITI MAKING
MENTALLY ILL?
MIRROR EFFECT
CONCEPTUAL INCONTINENCE OF THE "MAN OF IDEAS"
LITERALLY APPLYING JOSEPH JACOTOT

AFTER THOUGHTS :

ALL RECENT ART IS CONTRIBUTING TO A CAPITALIST SPECTACLE ,THE CAPITALIST SPECTACLE
IS A FORM OF ABSTRACTION,IN SOME WAY IT IS NOT GIVING US THE FULL OR REAL PICTURE
IT ABSTRACTS TO THE EXTENT OF FETISHIZATION OF" THE REAL STATE OF THINGS"

Peter Osborne (writer and academic)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search

Peter Osborne is a writer and an academic teaching philosophy at Kingston University. He is a member of the editorial collective who edit the bi-monthly Marxist-oriented journal of critical theory Radical Philosophy.[1] In November 2007 he interviewed artist Jeff Wall for the journal.[2] He is a director of the Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy or CRMEP at Kingston University.[3] In May 2010, Osborne was suspended from his post at Middlesex University following his involvement in "campus occupations."[4] Osborne was one of a group of academics who joined Kingston University following a decision by Middlesex University to close the CRMEP in July 2010.[5]
[edit] Books

* The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde (Verso, 1995),
* Philosophy in Cultural Theory (Routledge, 2000),
* Conceptual Art (Phaidon, 2002),
* How to Read Marx (Granta, 2005)
* El arte más allá de la estética. Ensayos filosóficos sobre arte contemporáneo, trans. Yaiza Hernández Velázquez (Cendeac, 2010)

[edit] References

1. ^ Radical Philosophy masthead
2. ^ Peter Osborne Art after photography, after conceptual art, Radical Philosophy July/August 2008.
3. ^ Kingston University Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
4. ^ Unattributed Philosophy students and staff suspended Save Middlesex Philosophy, accessed, October 29, 2010
5. ^ John Morgan Students forced to end sit-in, but vow to fight on, Times Higher Education, May 20, 2010.

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Osborne_(writer_and_academic)"
Categories: Academics of Kingston University | Philosophy teachers

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La misma inteligencia crea los nombres y crea los signos de las matemáticas. La misma inteligencia crea los signos y crea los razonamientos. No existen dos tipos de espíritu. Existen distintas manifestaciones de la inteligencia, según sea mayor o menor la energía que la voluntad comunique a la inteligencia para descubrir y combinar relaciones nuevas, pero no existen jerarquías en la capacidad intelectual. Es la toma de conciencia de esta igualdad de naturaleza la que se llama emancipación y la que abre la posibilidad a todo tipo de aventuras en el país del conocimiento. Ya que se trata de atreverse a aventurarse y no de aprender más o menos bien o más o menos rápido. El «método Jacotot» no es mejor, es otro. Ésta es la razón por la que los procedimientos puestos en juego importan poco por sí mismos."
El maestro ignorante. Jacques Ranciere . p.19

"De este modo, el socratismo es una forma perfeccionada del atontamiento. Al igual que todo maestro sabio, Sócrates pregunta para instruir. Ahora bien, quien quiere emancipar a un hombre debe preguntarle a la manera de los hombres y no a la de los sabios, para ser instruido y no para instruir. Y eso sólo lo hará con exactitud aquél que efectivamente no sepa más que el alumno, el que no haya hecho antes que él el viaje, el maestro ignorante."

El maestro ignorante. Jacques Ranciere . p.20

Joseph Jacotot
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Joseph (or Jean-Joseph) Jacotot (4 March 1770 - 30 July 1840) was a French teacher and educational philosopher, creator of the method of "intellectual emancipation." He was born at Dijon on the 4th of March 1770. He was educated at the university of Dijon, where in his nineteenth year he was made a professor of Latin, after which he studied law, became a lawyer, and at the same time devoted a large amount of his attention to mathematics. In 1788 he organized a federation of the youth of Dijon for the defence of the principles of the Revolution; and in 1792, with the rank of captain, he set out to take part in the campaign of Belgium, where he conducted himself with bravery and distinction. After filling the office of secretary of the commission d’organisation du mouvement des armées, in 1794 he became deputy of the director of the École Polytechnique. Upon the founding of the central schools at Dijon he was appointed to the chair of the "method" or instruction of science. There he made his first experiments in his "emancipatory" method of teaching. When the central schools were replaced by other educational institutions, Jacotot occupied the chairs of mathematics and of Roman law until the overthrow of the empire. In 1815 he was elected a representative to the chamber of deputies; but after the Second Restoration he found it necessary to quit his native land.

Having taken up his residence at Brussels, in 1818 Jacotot was nominated teacher of the French language at the University of Louvain, where he systematized the educational principles which he had already practised with success in France.

His emancipatory or panecastic (French: panécastique "everything in each" from Greek πᾶν and ἕκαστον) method was not only adopted in several institutions in Belgium, but also met with some approval in France, England, Germany, and Russia. It was based on three principles:

1. all men have equal intelligence;
2. every man has received from God the faculty of being able to instruct himself;
3. everything is in everything.

Regarding the first principle, he maintained that it is only in the will to use their intelligence that men differ. His own process, depending on the third principle, was to give a student learning a language for the first time a short passage of a few lines, and to encourage the pupil to study first the words, then the letters, then the grammar, then the meaning, until a single paragraph became the occasion for learning an entire literature. After the revolution of 1830 Jacotot returned to France, and he died in Paris on 30 July 1840.

Jacotot described his system in Enseignement universel (universal education), langue maternelle (Louvain and Dijon, 1823)—which passed through several editions—and in various other works; and he also advocated his views in the Journal de l’êmancipation intellectuelle and elsewhere. For a complete list of his works and fuller details regarding his career, see Biographie de J. Jacotot, by Achille Guillard (Paris, 1860).

Jacotot's career and principles are also described by Jacques Rancière in The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation (Stanford University Press, 1991).

This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Chisholm, Hugh, ed (1911). Encyclopædia Britannica (Eleventh ed.). Cambridge University Press.
Persondata
Name Jacotot, Joseph
Alternative names
Short description
Date of birth 4 March 1770
Place of birth
Date of death 30 July 1840
Place of death
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Jacotot"

10.
www.filo.uba.ar/contenidos/secretarias/seube/revistaespacios/.../41.14.pdf

DAY TWO FOR THE WORKSHOP: PERIPATETIC SCHOOL DRIFT

2010-12-07T12:54:00.001-08:00

TOPICS:
ABERRATIONS OF CURATORIAL LANGUAJE
THE CENTRE D'ART SANTA MONICA AFFAIR/THE COUP AT FERRAN BARENBLIT
NOTIONS OF DETOUR AND DRIFT
FOUND AND LEFT THERE SCULPTURE
THEORY OF ART POWER AND SYSTEMS
SEARCH FOR REFERENTS

Los ejercicios peripatéticos provenían de las doctrinas de Aristóteles y se basaban en la discusión de proposiciones metafísicas y teológicas bajo ciertas reglas de lógica que, apoyándose en los maestros de la Antigüedad clásica, buscaban la obtención de verdades inmutables. Su característica esencial fue la negación d...el realismo. La naturaleza y sus fenómenos se deberían estudiar, pero no por si mismos sino, como una representación terrena (impura) de lo perfecto, de lo divino, de lo que nunca cambiaba.

Peripatetic school
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The Peripatetics were members of a school of philosophy in ancient Greece. Their teachings derived from their founder, the Greek philosopher, Aristotle, and Peripatetic is a name given to his followers. The school originally derived its name Peripatos from the peripatoi (περίπατοι "colonnades") of the Lyceum gymnasium in Athens where the members met. A similar Greek word peripatetikos (Greek: περιπατητικός) refers to the act of walking, and as an adjective, "peripatetic" is often used to mean itinerant, wandering, meandering, or walking about. After Aristotle's death, a legend arose that he was a "peripatetic" lecturer -- that he walked about as he taught -- and the designation Peripatetikos came to replace the original Peripatos.

The school dates from around 335 BC when Aristotle began teaching in the Lyceum. It was an informal institution whose members conducted philosophical and scientific inquiries. Aristotle's successors Theophrastus and Strato continued the tradition of exploring philosophical and scientific theories, but after the middle of the 3rd century BC, the school fell into a decline, and it was not until the Roman era that there was a revival. Later members of the school concentrated on preserving and commentating on Aristotle's works rather than extending them, and the school eventually died out in the 3rd century AD.

Although the school died out, the study of Aristotle's works continued by scholars who were called Peripatetics through Later Antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance. After the fall of the Roman empire, the works of the Peripatetic school were lost to the west, but in the east they were incorporated into early Islamic philosophy, which would play a large part in the revival of Aristotle's doctrines in Europe in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.
Contents
[hide]

* 1 Background
* 2 Doctrines
* 3 History of the school
* 4 Influence
* 5 Notes
* 6 References
* 7 See also

[edit] Background

The term "Peripatetic" is a transliteration of the ancient Greek word περιπατητικός peripatêtikos, which means "of walking" or "given to walking about".[1] The Peripatetic school was actually known simply as the Peripatos.[2] Aristotle's school came to be so named because of the peripatoi ("colonnades" or "covered walkways") of the Lyceum gymnasium where the members met.[3] The legend that the name came from Aristotle's alleged habit of walking while lecturing may have started with Hermippus of Smyrna.[4] Unlike Plato, Aristotle was not a citizen of Athens and so could not own property; he and his colleagues therefore used the grounds of the Lyceum as a gathering place, just as it had been used by earlier philosophers such as Socrates.[5] Aristotle and his colleagues first began to use the Lyceum in this way in about 335 BC.,[6] after Aristotle left Plato's Academy and Athens and then returned to Athens from his travels about a dozen years later.[7] Because of the school's association with the gymnasium, the school also came to be referred to simply as the Lyceum.[5] Some modern scholars argue that the school did not become formally institutionalized until Theophrastus took it over, at which time there was private property associated with the school.[8]

Originally at least, the Peripatetic gatherings were probably conducted less formally than the term "school" suggests: there was likely no set curriculum or requirements for students, or even fees for membership.[9] Aristotle did teach and lecture there, but there was also philosophical and scientific research done in partnership with other members of the school.[10] It seems likely that many of the writings that have come down to us in Aristotle's name were based on lectures he gave at the school, or vice versa.[11]

Among the members of the school in Aristotle's time were Theophrastus, Phanias of Eresus, Eudemus of Rhodes, Clytus of Miletus, Aristoxenus, and Dicaearchus.[12] Much like Plato's Academy, there were in Aristotle's school junior and senior members, the junior members generally serving as pupils or assistants to the senior members who directed research and lectured.[12] The aim of the school, at least in Aristotle's time, was not to further a specific doctrine, but rather to explore philosophical and scientific theories; those who ran the school worked rather as equal partners.[12]

Sometime shortly after Alexander's death in June 323 BC, Aristotle left Athens to avoid persecution by anti-Macedonian factions in Athens due to his ties to Macedonia.[13]

After Aristotle's death in 322 BC, his colleague Theophrastus succeeded him as head of the school. The most prominent member of the school after Theophrastus was Strato of Lampsacus, who increased the naturalistic elements of Aristotle's philosophy and embraced a form of atheism.
[edit] Doctrines

The doctrines of the Peripatetic school are the doctrines laid down by Aristotle, and henceforth maintained by his followers.

Whereas Plato had sought to explain things with his theory of Forms, Aristotle preferred to start from the facts given by experience. Philosophy to him meant science, and its aim was the recognition of the "why" in all things. Hence he endeavoured to attain to the ultimate grounds of things by induction; that is to say, by a posteriori conclusions from a number of facts to a universal.[14] Logic either deals with appearances, and is then called dialectics; or of truth, and is then called analytics.[15]

All change or motion takes place in regard to substance, quantity, quality and place.[15] There are three kinds of substances - those alternately in motion and at rest, as the animals; those perpetually in motion, as the sky; and those eternally stationary. The last, in themselves immovable and imperishable, are the source and origin of all motion. Among them there must be one first being, unchangeable, which acts without the intervention of any other being. All that is proceeds from it; it is the most perfect intelligence - God.[15] The immediate action of this prime mover - happy in the contemplation of itself - extends only to the heavens; the other inferior spheres are moved by other incorporeal and eternal substances, which the popular belief adores as gods. The heavens are of a more perfect and divine nature than other bodies. In the centre of the universe is the Earth, round and stationary. The stars, like the sky, beings of a higher nature, but of grosser matter, move by the impulse of the prime mover.[15]

For Aristotle, matter is the basis of all that exists; it comprises the potentiality of everything, but of itself is not actually anything.[14] A determinate thing only comes into being when the potentiality in matter is converted into actuality. This is achieved by form, the idea existent not as one outside the many, but as one in the many, the completion of the potentiality latent in the matter.[14]

The soul is the principle of life in the organic body, and is inseparable from the body. As faculties of the soul, Aristotle enumerates the faculty of reproduction and nutrition; of sensation, memory and recollection; the faculty of reason, or understanding; and the faculty of desiring, which is divided into appetition and volition.[15] By the use of reason conceptions, which are formed in the soul by external sense-impressions, and may be true or false, are converted into knowledge.[14] For reason alone can attain to truth either in understanding or action.[14]

The best and highest goal is the happiness which originates from virtuous actions.[15] Aristotle did not, with Plato, regard virtue as knowledge pure and simple, but as founded on nature, habit, and reason.[14] Virtue consists in acting according to nature: that is, keeping the mean between the two extremes of the too much and the too little.[15] Thus valor, in his view the first of virtues, is a mean between cowardice and recklessness; temperance is the mean in respect to sensual enjoyments and the total avoidance of them.[15]
[edit] History of the school
Aristotle and his disciples - Alexander, Demetrius, Theophrastus, and Strato. Part of a fresco in the National University of Athens.

The names of the first seven or eight scholarchs (leaders) of the Peripatetic school are known with varying levels of certainty. A list of names with the approximate dates they headed the school is as follows:[16]

* Aristotle (c. 334-322)
* Theophrastus (322-288)
* Strato of Lampsacus (288-c. 269)
* Lyco of Troas (c. 269-225)
* Aristo of Ceos (225-c. 190)
* Critolaus (c. 190-155)
* Diodorus of Tyre (c. 140)
* Erymneus (c. 110)

There are some uncertainties in this list. It is not certain whether Aristo of Ceos was the head of the school, but since he was a close pupil of Lyco and the most important Peripatetic philosopher in the time when he lived, it is generally assumed that he was. It is not known if Critolaus directly succeeded Aristo, or if there were any leaders between them. Erymneus is known only from a passing reference by Athenaeus.[17] Other important Peripatetic philosophers who lived during these centuries include Eudemus of Rhodes, Aristoxenus, Dicaearchus, and Clearchus of Soli.

After the time of Strato, the Peripatetic school fell into a decline. Lyco was famous more for his oratory than his philosophical skills, and Aristo is perhaps best known for his biographical studies;[18] and although Critolaus was more philosophically active, none of the Peripatetic philosophers in this period seem to have contributed anything original to philosophy.[19] The reasons for the decline of the Peripatetic school are unclear. Undoubtably Stoicism and Epicureanism provided many answers for those people looking for dogmatic and comprehensive philosophical systems, and the scepticism of the Middle Academy may have seemed preferable to anyone who rejected dogmatism.[20] Later tradition linked the school's decline to Neleus of Scepsis and his descendents hiding the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus in a cellar until their rediscovery in the 1st century BC, and even though this story may be doubted, it is possible that Aristotle's works were not widely read.[21]

In 86 BCE, Athens was sacked by the Roman general Lucius Cornelius Sulla, all the schools of philosophy in Athens were badly disrupted, and the Lyceum ceased to exist as a functioning institution.[19] Ironically, this event seems to have brought new life to the Peripatetic school. Sulla brought the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus back to Rome, where they became the basis of a new collection of Aristotle's writings compiled by Andronicus of Rhodes which forms the basis of the Corpus Aristotelicum which exists today.[19] Later Neoplatonist writers describe Andronicus, who lived around 50 BCE, as the eleventh scholarch of the Peripatetic school,[22] which would imply that he had two unnamed predecessors. There is considerable uncertainty over the issue, and Andronicus' pupil Boethus of Sidon is also described as the eleventh scholarch.[23] It is quite possible that Andronicus set up a new school where he taught Boethus.

Whereas the earlier Peripatetics had sought to extend and develop Aristotle's works, from the time of Andronicus the school concentrated on preserving and defending his work.[24] The most important figure in the Roman era is Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. 200 CE) who commentated on Aristotle's writings. With the rise of Neoplatonism (and Christianity) in the 3rd century, Peripateticism as an independent philosophy came to an end, but the Neoplatonists sought to incorporate Aristotle's philosophy within their own system, and produced many commentaries on Aristotle's works. In the 5th century, Olympiodorus the Elder is sometimes described as a Peripatetic.
[edit] Influence
Main article: Aristotelianism
See also: Avicennism, Averroism, and Scholasticism

The last philosophers in classical antiquity to comment on Aristotle were Simplicius and Boethius in the 6th century. After this, although his works were mostly lost to the west, they were maintained in the east where they were incorporated into early Islamic philosophy. Some of the greatest Peripatetic philosophers in the Islamic philosophical tradition were Al-Kindi (Alkindus), Al-Farabi (Alpharabius), Avicenna (Ibn Sina) and Averroes (Ibn Rushd). By the 12th century, Aristotle's works began being translated into Latin during the Latin translations of the 12th century, and gradually arose Scholastic philosophy under such names as Thomas Aquinas, which took its tone and complexion from the writings of Aristotle, the commentaries of Averroes, and The Book of Healing of Avicenna.
[edit] Notes

1. ^ The entry peripatêtikos in Liddell, Henry and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon.
2. ^ Furley 2003a, p. 1141; Lynch 1997, p. 311
3. ^ Nussbaum 2003, p. 166; Furley 2003a, p. 1141; Lynch 1997, p. 311
4. ^ Furley 1970, p. 801 citing Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 5.2. Some modern scholars discredit the legend altogether; see p. 229 & p. 229 n. 156, in Hegel 2006, p. 229
5. ^ a b Furley 2003a, p. 1141
6. ^ 336 BC: Furley 2003a, p. 1141; 335 BC: Lynch 1997, p. 311; 334 BC: Irwin 2003
7. ^ Barnes 2000, p. 14
8. ^ Ostwald & Lynch 1982, p. 623, citing Diogenes Laertius, 5.39 & 5.52.
9. ^ Barnes 2000, p. 9
10. ^ Barnes 2000, pp. 7–9
11. ^ Irwin 2003
12. ^ a b c Ostwald & Lynch 1982, pp. 623–4
13. ^ Barnes 2000, p. 11
14. ^ a b c d e f "Greek Philosophy" entry in Seyffert 1895, p. 482
15. ^ a b c d e f g h "Peripatetic philosophy" entry in Lieber, Wigglesworth & Bradford 1832, p. 22
16. ^ Ross & Ackrill 1995, p. 193
17. ^ Athenaeus, v. 211e
18. ^ Furley 2003b, p. 150
19. ^ a b c Drozdek 2007, p. 205
20. ^ Furley 2003b, p. 151
21. ^ Furley 2003b, p. 152
22. ^ Ammonius, In de Int. 5.24
23. ^ Ammonius, In An. Pr. 31.11
24. ^ Furley 2003b, p. 153

[edit] References

* Barnes, Jonathan (2000), Aristotle: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford Paperbacks, ISBN 0192854089 .
* Drozdek, Adam (2007), Greek Philosophers as Theologians: The Divine Arche, Ashgate publishing, ISBN 075466189X .
* Furley, David (1970), "Peripatetic School", in Hammond, N. G. L.; Scullard, H. H., The Oxford Classical Dictionary (2nd ed.), Oxford University Press .
* Furley, David (2003a), "Peripatetic School", in Hornblower, Simon; Spawforth, Antony, The Oxford Classical Dictionary (3rd ed.), Oxford University Press, ISBN 0198606419 .
* Furley, David (2003b), From Aristotle to Augustine: Routledge History of Philosophy, 2, Routledge, ISBN 0415308747 .
* Hegel, G. W. F. (2006), Brown, Robert F., ed., Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825-1826: Greek Philosophy, 2, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0199279063 .
* Irwin, T. (2003), "Aristotle", in Craig, Edward, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/A022 .
* Lieber, Francis; Wigglesworth, Edward; Bradford, T. G. (1832), Encyclopedia Americana, 10 .
* Lynch, J. (1997), "Lyceum", in Zeyl, Donald J.; Devereux, Daniel; Mitsis, Phillip, Encyclopedia of Classical Philosophy, Greenwood Press, ISBN 0313287759 .
* Nussbaum, M. (2003), "Aristotle", in Hornblower, Simon; Spawforth, Antony, The Oxford Classical Dictionary (3rd ed.), Oxford University Press, ISBN 0198606419 .
* Ostwald, M.; Lynch, J. (1982), "The Growth of Schools & the Advance of Knowledge", in Lewis, D. M.; Boardman, John; Hornblower, Simon et al., The Cambridge Ancient History Volume 6: The Fourth Century BC, Cambridge University Press .
* Ross, David; Ackrill, John L. (1995), Aristotle, Routledge, ISBN 0415120683 .
* Seyffert, Oskar (1895), A Dictionary of Classical Antiquities .
* Fritz Wehrli (Ed.): Die Schule des Aristoteles. Texte und Kommentare. 10 volumes and 2 Supplements. Basel 1944-1959, 2. Edition 1967-1969.

[edit] See also
Look up Peripatetic in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.

DAY ONE FOR THE WORKSHOP: TROPIC TOPICS

2010-12-07T11:32:00.000-08:00

TOPICS:
GENDER OF ALL SORTS
HERMETIC ART DISCOURSES
POWER GAMES
UNDERGROUND CO-OPTED
HASH/ GRASS/ BEER
BARCELONA ON ID CRISIS
HYPOCRITICAL KNOLEDGE
FREE LEARNING

CHUPACABRAS DOES MIAMI BASEL LIVE FROM THE BEACH

2010-12-06T07:32:00.000-08:00

THE CHUPACABRAS EFFECT AT THE PSYCHOTROPIC WORKSHOPS
MIAMI BASEL TRANSFERENCE LIVE FROM ANTIGUA CASA HAIKU
OPENING NIGHT .........

DAY FIVE

2010-12-05T07:59:00.001-08:00

Extract from a Boris Groys text:
An artistic installation, on the contrary, builds a community of spectators precisely because of the holistic, unifying character of the installation space. The true visitor to the art installation is not an isolated individual, but a collective of visitors. The art space as such can only be perceived by a mass of visitors—a multitude, if you like—with this multitude becoming part of the exhibition for each individual visitor, and vice versa.......
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
More than anything else, what the installation offers to the fluid, circulating multitudes is an aura of the here and now. The installation is, above all, a mass-cultural version of individual flânerie, as described by Benjamin, and therefore a place for the emergence of aura, for “profane illumination.” In general, the installation operates as a reversal of reproduction. The installation takes a copy out of an unmarked, open space of anonymous circulation and places it—if only temporarily—within a fixed, stable, closed context of the topologically well-defined “here and now.” Our contemporary condition cannot be reduced to being a “loss of the aura” to the circulation of ritual beyond “here and now,” as described in Benjamin’s famous essay on “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.”³ Rather, the contemporary age organizes a complex interplay of dislocations and relocations, of deterritorializations and reterritorializations, of de-auratizations and re-auratizations.

Benjamin shared high modernist art’s belief in a unique, normative context for art. Under this presupposition, to lose its unique, original context means for an artwork to lose its aura forever—to become a copy of itself. To re-auratize an individual artwork would require a sacralization of the whole profane space of a copy’s topologically undetermined mass circulation—a totalitarian, fascist project, to be sure. This is the main problem to be found in Benjamin’s thinking: he perceives the space of a copy’s mass circulation—and mass circulation in general—as a universal, neutral, and homogeneous space. He insists upon the visual recognizability, on the self-identity of a copy as it circulates in our contemporary culture. But both of these principal presuppositions in Benjamin’s text are questionable. In the framework of contemporary culture, an image is permanently circulating from one medium to another medium, and from one closed context to another closed context. For example, a bit of film footage can be shown in a cinema, then converted to a digital form and appear on somebody’s Web site, or be shown during a conference as an illustration, or watched privately on a television in a person’s living room, or placed in the context of a museum installation. In this way, through different contexts and media, this bit of film footage is transformed by different program languages, different software, different framings on the screen, different placement in an installation space, and so on. All this time, are we dealing with the same film footage? Is it the same copy of the same copy of the same original? The topology of today’s networks of communication, generation, translation, and distribution of images is extremely heterogeneous. The images are constantly transformed, rewritten, reedited, and reprogrammed as they circulate through these networks—and with each step they are visually altered. Their status as copies of copies becomes an everyday cultural convention, as was previously the case with the status of the original. Benjamin suggests that the new technology is capable of producing copies with increasing fidelity to the original, when in fact the opposite is the case. Contemporary technology thinks in generations—and to transmit information from one generation of hardware and software to the next is to transform it in a significant way. The metaphoric notion of “generation” as it is now used in the context of technology is particularly revealing. Where there are generations, there are also generational Oedipal conflicts. All of us know what it means to transmit a certain cultural heritage from one generation of students to another.

We are unable to stabilize a copy as a copy, as we are unable to stabilize an original as an original. There are no eternal copies as there are no eternal originals. Reproduction is as much infected by originality as originality is infected by reproduction. In circulating through various contexts, a copy becomes a series of different originals. Every change of context, every change of medium can be interpreted as a negation of the status of a copy as a copy—as an essential rupture, as a new start that opens a new future. In this sense, a copy is never really a copy, but rather a new original, in a new context. Every copy is by itself a flâneur—experiencing time and again its own “profane illuminations” that turn it into an original. It loses old auras and gains new auras. It remains perhaps the same copy, but it becomes different originals. This also shows a postmodern project of reflecting on the repetitive, iterative, reproductive character of an image (inspired by Benjamin) to be as paradoxical as the modern project of recognizing the original and the new. This is likewise why postmodern art tends to look very new, even if—or actually because—it is directed against the very notion of the new. Our decision to recognize a certain image as either an original or a copy is dependent on the context—on the scene in which this decision is taken. This decision is always a contemporary decision—one that belongs not to the past and not to the future, but to the present. And this decision is also always a sovereign decision—in fact, the installation is a space for such a decision where “here and now” emerges and profane illumination of the masses takes place.

So one can say that installation practice demonstrates the dependency of any democratic space (in which masses or multitudes demonstrate themselves to themselves) on the private, sovereign decisions of an artist as its legislator. This was something that was very well known to the ancient Greek thinkers, as it was to the initiators of the earlier democratic revolutions. But recently, this knowledge somehow became suppressed by the dominant political discourse. Especially after Foucault, we tend to detect the source of power in impersonal agencies, structures, rules, and protocols. However, this fixation on the impersonal mechanisms of power lead us to overlook the importance of individual, sovereign decisions and actions taking place in private, heterotopic spaces (to use another term introduced by Foucault). Likewise, the modern, democratic powers have meta-social, meta-public, heterotopic origins. As has been mentioned, the artist who designs a certain installation space is an outsider to this space. He or she is heterotopic to this space. But the outsider is not necessarily somebody who has to be included in order to be empowered. There is also empowerment by exclusion, and especially by self-exclusion. The outsider can be powerful precisely because he or she is not controlled by society, and is not limited in his or her sovereign actions by any public discussion or by any need for public self-justification. And it would be wrong to think that this kind of powerful outsidership can be completely eliminated through Modern progress and democratic revolutions. The progress is rational. But not accidentally, an artist is supposed by our culture to be mad—at least to be obsessed. Foucault thought that medicine men, witches, and prophets have no prominent place in our society any more—that they became outcasts, confined to psychiatric clinics. But our culture is primarily a celebrity culture, and you cannot become a celebrity without being mad (or at least pretending to be). Obviously, Foucault read too many scientific books and only a few society and gossip magazines, because otherwise he would have known where mad people today have their true social place. It is also well known that the contemporary political elite is a part of global celebrity culture, which is to say that it is external to the society it rules. Global, extra-democratic, trans-state, external to any democratically organized community, paradigmatically private—I would say that these are the icons of a privacy understood also as a rejection of logic and reason, as a degree of sovereignty of judgment equivalent to madness. These icons are, in fact, structurally mad—insane.
Now, these reflections should not be misunderstood as a critique of installation as an art form by demonstrating its sovereign character. The goal of art, after all, is not to change things—things are changing by themselves all the time anyway. Art’s function is rather to show, to make visible the realities that are generally overlooked. By taking aesthetic responsibility in a very explicit way for the design of the installation space, the artist reveals the hidden sovereign dimension of the contemporary democratic order that politics, for the most part, tries to conceal. The installation space is where we are immediately confronted with the ambiguous character of the contemporary notion of freedom that functions in our democracies in parallel with sovereign and institutional freedom. The artistic installation is thus a space of unconcealment (in the Heideggerian sense) of the heterotopic, sovereign power that is concealed behind the obscure transparency of the democratic order.
×
A version of this text was given as a lecture at Whitechapel Gallery, London, on October 2, 2008.

DAY FOUR

2010-12-05T07:31:00.000-08:00

More from Boris Groys
Now, the artistic installation does not circulate. Rather, it installs everything that usually circulates in our civilization: objects, texts, films, etc. At the same time, it changes in a very radical way the role and the function of the exhibition space. The installation operates by means of a symbolic privatization of the public space of an exhibition. It may appear to be a standard, curated exhibition, but its space is designed according to the sovereign will of an individual artist who is not supposed to publicly justify the selection of the included objects, or the organization of the installation space as a whole. The installation is frequently denied the status of a specific art form, because it is not obvious what the medium of an installation actually is. Traditional art media are all defined by a specific material support: canvas, stone, or film. The material support of the installation medium is the space itself. That does not mean, however, that the installation is somehow “immaterial.” On the contrary, the installation is material par excellence, since it is spatial—and being in the space is the most general definition of being material. The installation transforms the empty, neutral, public space into an individual artwork—and it invites the visitor to experience this space as the holistic, totalizing space of an artwork. Anything included in such a space becomes a part of the artwork simply because it is placed inside this space. The distinction between art object and simple object becomes insignificant here. Instead, what becomes crucial is the distinction between a marked, installation space and unmarked, public space.

DAY ONE

2010-12-03T05:08:00.001-08:00

REPTILIANS ALL OVER THE WORLD ARE AMONG US!!

La leyenda del Chupacabras

La leyenda del Chupacabras nos habla de una criatura vampírica que chupa la sangre de animales (en especial cabras) en Latinoamérica, aunque ya se ha dejado ver en zonas como Miami...

El origen del Chupacabras es oscuro como todo origen de mito o leyenda. De todas formas, en Barcelona hay una familia que guarda un secreto a cal y canto al que he tenido acceso por ser una de sus descendientes.

En 1879, unos de mis misteriosos tíos le encargó a mi bisabuelo, que era capitán de un transatlántico que hacía la ruta hacía Nueva York y el nuevo continente, que se llevara a su hijo extraño en las bodegas y lo dejara suelto por la selva puertorriqueña porque era una vergüenza para la familia.

El hijo en cuestión era un dandy estrambótico que había viajado a Londres y era fan de Aleister Crowley y que, aparte de masón, era bisexual y mago. Como era un peligro para la buena reputación burguesa de la familia, un buen día lo durmieron con cloroformo y así, atadito e incapaz de defenderse, lo metieron en uno de los barcos en los que trabajaba su tío, o sea mi bisabuelo.

Se dice que en las bodegas del barco había una sustancia con la que traficaban (un predecesor del ron muy parecido a la Absenta) y algún que otro esclavo.

Los esclavos también estaban atados pero, como todos sabemos, siempre hay algún alma caritativa hasta en las peores circunstancias y esta alma les daba un montón a beber de ese brebaje extraño verde fosforescente. Así que se pasaron toda la travesía casi en coma etílico.

Una vez en Puerto Rico, soltaron a mi pobre ancestro, cuyo único pecado era ser un vicioso, sufrir de priapismo y tener mucho talento.

No se sabe que pasó, pero su capacidad de adaptación y experimentación eran proverbiales, así que nosotros pensamos muchas veces, aunque no se lo decimos a nadie, que el Chupacabras es nuestro pobre tío que ya mutó, después de varios hechizos y visitas a chamanes y que va por ahí muerto de hambre el pobrecillo. Aunque eso sí: follar sigue follando de mala manera.

Esther Planas

STARTING POINTS

2010-11-28T04:36:00.001-08:00

DETOURNED MAGS AND BOOKS ,HELIO OTEICICA SPIRIT, RED PAINTINGS,
BOARDS WITH PICTURES OF WORKS FROM 1999,REDRUM TEXT 1999,
MICROPHONE,SPOKEN WORD,MIC STAND,IVES KLEIN AND ALLAN KAPROW,
FILMS RETROSPECTIVE,LOST DREAM ALL NIGHT,MIAMI BASEL ART BASEL
MUSIC,ANTONIN ARTAUD.
Yves Klein
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Yves Klein

Yves Klein during the work on the Gelsenkirchen Opera, 1959
Born 28 April 1928(1928-04-28)
Nice
Died 6 June 1962(1962-06-06) (aged 34)
Paris, France
Nationality French
Field Artist
Movement Nouveau Réalisme
Works IKB 191 (1962)
Monotone Symphony (1949)

Yves Klein (French pronunciation: [iv klɛ̃]) (28 April 1928 – 6 June 1962) was a French artist considered an important figure in post-war European art. New York critics of Klein's time classify him as neo-Dada, but other critics, such as Thomas McEvilley in an essay submitted to Artforum in 1982, have since classified Klein as an early, though enigmatic, postmodernist.[1]
Contents
[hide]

* 1 Biography
* 2 Artwork
o 2.1 Monochrome works: The Blue Epoch
o 2.2 The Void
o 2.3 Anthropométries
o 2.4 Aero works
o 2.5 Multiples
o 2.6 Last years
* 3 Legacy
* 4 See also
* 5 References
* 6 External links

[edit] Biography

Klein was born in Nice, in the Alpes-Maritimes department of France. His parents, Fred Klein and Marie Raymond, were both painters. His father painted in a loose Post-impressionist style, whilst his mother was a leading figure in Art informel, and held regular soirées with other leading practitioners of this Parisian abstract movement.

From 1942 to 1946, Klein studied at the École Nationale de la Marine Marchande and the École Nationale des Langues Orientales and began practicing judo. At this time, he became friends with Arman Fernandez and Claude Pascal and started to paint. At the age of nineteen, Klein and his friends lay on a beach in the south of France, and divided the world between themselves; Arman chose the earth, Claude, words, whilst Yves chose the ethereal space surrounding the planet, which he then proceeded to sign:

With this famous symbolic gesture of signing the sky, Klein had foreseen, as in a reverie, the thrust of his art from that time onwards—a quest to reach the far side of the infinite.[2]

Between 1947–1948,[3] Klein conceived his Monotone Symphony (1949, formally The Monotone-Silence Symphony) that consisted of a single 20-minute sustained chord followed by a 20-minute silence[4][5] – a precedent to both La Monte Young's drone music and John Cage's silent 4′33″. During the years 1948 to 1952, he traveled to Italy, Great Britain, Spain, and Japan. In Japan, at the early age of 25, he became a master at judo receiving the rank of yodan (4th dan/degree black-belt) from the Kodokan, which at that time was a remarkable achievement for a westerner. He also stayed in Japan in 1953. Klein later wrote a book on Judo called Les fondements du judo. In 1954, Klein settled permanently in Paris and began in earnest to establish himself in the art world.
[edit]
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Allan Kaprow
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Allan Kaprow (23 de agosto de 1927 - 5 de abril de 2006) fue un pintor estadounidense pionero en el establecimiento de los conceptos de arte de performance.

Allan Kaprow ayudó a desarrollar las instalaciones artísticas y los happenings a fines de los años cincuenta y sesenta. Sus happenings, alrededor de doscientos, fueron evolucionando a lo largo de los años. Con el tiempo, Kaprow cambió su práctica en lo que él llamó «Actividades», relacionando íntimamente piezas para uno o varios jugadores y dedicadas al examen de los comportamientos y hábitos cotidianos de una manera casi indistinguible de la vida ordinaria. A su vez, su obra influye en Fluxus, el arte de performance y la instalación artística.

Estudió composición con John Cage en su famosa clase en la New School for Social Research, pintura con Hans Hofmann e historia del arte con Meyer Schapiro. Los trabajos de Kaprow intentan integrar el arte y la vida. A través de happenings, la separación entre vida y arte, y el artista y el público se vuelve borrosa. Publicó extensamente y fue Profesor Emérito en el Departamento de Artes Visuales de la Universidad de California, San Diego. Kaprow es conocido también por la idea de un «no-arte», que se encuentra en sus ensayos Arte que no puede ser arte y La Educación del No-artista.

Su influencia es también evidente en el Instituto de Arte de California, donde fue profesor durante los primeros años de formación.

Es célebre su frase «La línea entre el arte y la vida debe mantenerse tan fluida, y quizás indistinta, como sea posible».
[editar] Enlaces externos

* Colabora en Wikiquote Wikiquote alberga frases célebres de o sobre Allan Kaprow. Wikiquote
* Allan Kaprow, 18 Happenings en 6 partes, 9-11 de noviembre de 2006
* Entrevista con Allan Kaprow

Obtenido de "http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allan_Kaprow"

Psicotrópico (del griego psyche, "mente" y tropein, "tornar") es un agente que actúa sobre el sistema nervioso central, lo cual trae como consecuencia cambios temporales en la percepción, ánimo, estado de conciencia y comportamiento.
psy·cho·tro·pic (sk-trpk, -trpk) adj. Having an altering effect on perception or behavior. A psychotropic drug or other agent.
psychotropic [-trop?ik] Etymology: Gk, psyche + trepein, to turn exerting an effect on the mind or modifying mental activity
psychotropic (s??·k?·tr??·pik), adj concerns that that affect the mind and influence behavior. psychotropic capable of modifying mental activity.

Y la naturaleza de inventar no es distinta a la de acordarse. Dejemos pues a los explicadores «formar» el «gusto» y «la imaginación» de los señoritos, dejémosles disertar sobre el "genio" de los creadores. Nosotros nos limitaremos a hacer como estos creadores: como Hacine que aprendió de memoria, tradujo, repitió, imitó a Eurípides, Bossuet que hizo lo mismo con Tertuliano, Rousseau con Amyot, Boileau con Horacio y Juvenal; como Demóstenes que copió ocho veces Tucídides, Hooft que leyó cincuenta y dos veces Tácito, Séneca que recomienda la lectura siempre renovada de un mismo libro, Haydn que repitió indefinidamente seis sonatas de Bach, Miguel Ángel ocupado en rehacer siempre el mismo torso...9 La potencia no se divide. Sólo existe un poder, el de ver y el de decir, el de prestar atención a lo que se ve y a lo que se dice. Aprendemos frases y más frases; descubrimos los hechos, es decir, las relaciones entre cosas, y más relaciones aún, todas de la misma naturaleza; aprendemos a combinar las letras, las palabras, las frases, las ideas... No diremos que hemos adquirido la ciencia, que conocemos la verdad o que nos hemos convertido en un genio. Pero sabremos que podemos, en el orden intelectual, todo lo que puede un hombre.

Extracte del Maestro Emancipado de Jacques Ranciere

I am not You!!
Baudrillard argued that meaning (value) is created through difference - through what something is not (so "dog" means "dog" because it is not-"cat", not-"goat", not-"tree", etc.). In fact, he viewed meaning as near enough self-referential: objects, images of objects, words and signs are situated in a web of meaning; one object's meaning is only understandable through its relation to the meaning of other objects; in other words, one thing's prestige relates to another's mundanity.

Art Dustbin

The end of history is, alas, also the end of the dustbins of history. There are no longer any dustbins for disposing of old ideologies, old regimes, old values. Where are we going to throw Marxism, which actually invented the dustbins of history? (Yet there is some justice here since the very people who invented them have fallen in.) Conclusion: if there are no more dustbins of history, this is because History itself has become a dustbin. It has become its own dustbin, just as the planet itself is becoming its own dustbin

Unwritten doctrine

For a long time Plato's unwritten doctrine[32][33][34] had been considered unworthy of attention. Most of the books on Plato seem to diminish its importance. Nevertheless the first important witness who mentions its existence is Aristotle, who in his Physics (209 b) writes: "It is true, indeed, that the account he gives there [i.e. in Timaeus] of the participant is different from what he says in his so-called unwritten teaching (?????? ???????)." The term ?????? ??????? literally means unwritten doctrine and it stands for the most fundamental metaphysical teaching of Plato, which he disclosed only to his most trusted fellows and kept secret from the public. The reason for not revealing it to everyone is partially discussed in Phaedrus (276 c) where Plato criticizes the written transmission of knowledge as faulty, favoring instead the spoken logos: "he who has knowledge of the just and the good and beautiful ... will not, when in earnest, write them in ink, sowing them through a pen with words, which cannot defend themselves by argument and cannot teach the truth effectually." The same argument is repeated in Plato's Seventh Letter (344 c): "every serious man in dealing with really serious subjects carefully avoids writing." In the same letter he writes (341 c): "I can certainly declare concerning all these writers who claim to know the subjects that I seriously study ... there does not exist, nor will there ever exist, any treatise of mine dealing therewith." Such secrecy is necessary in order not "to expose them to unseemly and degrading treatment" (344 d).